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ABSTRACT: This article argues the more trauma endured by a population,
the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on
mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory
of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then
tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical
analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership
better understand civil wars and the limits of American power to end them.
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aps in current civil-war research negatively impact the policymakers
who decide whether the United States will intervene in another
nation’s civil war and the military servicemembers who plan for and
fight in those wars. This article attempts to fill in these gaps by developing and
testing a new trauma theory of civil war.
One primary theory argues civil wars occur when citizens become sufficiently
motivated. Another argues civil wars occur when citizens have the opportunity to
rebel. Neither explains how or why the threshold for taking human life varies across
time and space. Additionally, quantitative researchers have failed to find support
for most proxies of motivation, such as government type and ethnolinguistic or
religious fractionalization. Furthermore, the opportunity theory appears to lack a
causal mechanism. Instead, the opportunity to rebel is more likely an enabling
condition rather than a theory.1 Beyond widespread consensus that poverty, slow
economic growth, and large populations are associated with an increased risk of
civil war, substantial debate exists about the significance of other factors.2
This lack of understanding has resulted in the United States intervening in
the civil wars of other nations yet remaining largely unaware of the underlying
1. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1997), 10–12.
2. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results
on Civil War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006); Nicholas Sambanis, “A Review of Recent
Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War,” Defence and Peace Economics 13
no. 3 (2002): 229; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance,” Oxford
Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27; and Håvard Hegre, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy,
Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001).
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causes of the wars. Why, for example, was the prevalence of civil war so high
in Afghanistan yet so low in Bosnia before the United States intervened
in those countries? Answers to this question and similar ones could have
helped policymakers estimate the utility of military intervention and aided the
military in planning and executing a sound strategy for the achievement
of US objectives.
This article develops and tests a trauma theory of civil war. The potential
causal linkage is straightforward. The more trauma (for instance, torture, rape,
and disasters) endured by a country’s citizens, the more problems the citizens will
experience later, including mental illness, substance abuse, and diminished impulse
control. People dealing with these issues use violence more frequently to resolve
conflict and to achieve their goals than they would absent these conditions. As a
result, civil war becomes more likely.
Two key terms warrant further definition. Scholars typically define “civil war”
as armed conflict between a country’s government and a rebel group (or groups)
that takes place within the country’s borders and results in a minimum number
of fatalities over a specified period. Civil-war prevalence is thus the combined
probability of a war starting and an ongoing war continuing in a given year.3
The American Psychiatric Association defines a “traumatic stressor” as
“[a]ny event that may cause or threaten death, serious injury, or sexual violence to
an individual, a close family member, or a close friend.”4 Examples include being
tortured or raped, experiencing war, being assaulted with a weapon, experiencing a
natural disaster, and witnessing the death of a loved one. Intentional, man-made,
violent events directly experienced by the person have, on average, a more negative
effect than naturally occurring, indirectly experienced stressors.5
Three sections follow. The first builds the trauma theory by importing theory
from the trauma, mental health, and neurobiological fields. The second reports
the results of the statistical analysis of a large sample size. The final section posits

3. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of
Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (2002): 311.
4. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.
(Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2013).
5. Maria Pacella, Bryce Hruska, and Douglas Delahanty, “The Physical Health Consequences of PTSD
and PTSD Symptoms: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 27, no. 1 (January 2013): 42.
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policy recommendations for military planners, warfighters, and national security
policymakers.

Building a Trauma Theory of Civil War
Trauma may increase the prevalence of civil war in three ways. First, people
often become more violent in response to severe and repeated, traumatic
stressors, lowering the threshold at which citizens will use deadly force against
their government. Second, trauma makes civil war more feasible by decreasing
the capabilities of the government and its security force while lowering the
opportunity costs of rebel recruitment. Third, trauma increases grievances among
the population, which further motivates them to rebel against their governments.
Mechanism 1: Trauma, Violence, and Goal Achievement
An event during my deployment to Afghanistan illustrates how previously
experienced trauma can lead people to use violence as a normal way to achieve
their goals and resolve their problems. Colonel “Naseri” began berating Colonel
“Habib” in the operations center in front of their subordinates and their American
counterparts. Habib, the police chief for the province, had angered Naseri, the
chief of the provincial security directorate, by arresting one of Naseri’s men in
connection with the serial raping of an Afghan boy. Naseri used the moment to
publicly mock Habib, who had spent most of his adult life in the midst of war
and the trauma that came with it. The American forces loved Habib, who was one
of the few brave men who consistently took the fight to the enemy, and the drug
addiction we assessed he had was understandable in a land where self-medication
was frequently the only medication available.
With their subordinates watching, Habib’s verbal responses proved no
match for Naseri’s rhetorical skewering. As though a switch had flipped, Habib
unholstered his handgun. There, in the Afghan equivalent of a war room,
Habib aimed his loaded weapon at Naseri. Fortunately, a nearby American officer
moved between the two men and the loaded firearm and persuaded Habib to
reholster his weapon.
As trauma increases, violence becomes progressively normalized within society
as a legitimate way to achieve goals and resolve problems. As the threshold for
the use of lethal force lowers, civil war becomes more likely.
An increase in exposure to trauma includes one or more of the following
situations. The traumatic stressors may become more severe. Intentionally caused
events directly experienced by an individual, such as a physical assault with
a weapon, typically lead to worse outcomes than do acts of nature or indirectly
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experienced events. The severest traumatic stressors include torture, rape, and war.
The amount of traumatic events experienced by a person may accumulate over
time, and individuals may be exposed to multiple events. The traumatic events may
continue or the time since the last exposure to a traumatic event might be recent.
Figure 1 shows the potential causal linkage between trauma and civil war.

Figure 1. Potential pathway from trauma to civil war

Step One: More Mental Illness, Substance Abuse, and Impulse-Control Problems
Increased exposure to traumatic stressors causes an increased in mental
illness and substance abuse and diminished impulse control.6 For example,
30 to 50 percent of populations caught in war zones with high rates of
torture will likely develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).7 Other mental
illnesses (such as major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and disruptive,
impulse-control) and conduct disorders are also relevant to the study of trauma
and civil war. Researchers have found more-severe traumatic stressors result in
worse outcomes for the victim than less-severe traumatic events do. For instance,
being the victim of torture or physical assault with a weapon is associated with
more severe and long-lasting mental illness than experiencing trauma from a
natural disaster or witnessing the death of a loved one.8
Trauma also leads to substance-abuse issues. Studies of participants in
substance-abuse treatment programs found the co-occurrence of trauma
and substance abuse to be as high as 90 percent.9 Additionally, on average,
6. Zachary Steel et al., “Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events with Mental
Health Outcomes among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systemic Review and
Meta-analysis,” Journal of the American Medical Association 302, no. 5 (2009): 537–49, https://jamanetwork.com
/journals/jama/article-abstract/184348; Darrel Regier et al., “Comorbidity of Mental Disorders with Alcohol
and Other Drug Abuse,” Journal of the American Medical Association 264, no. 19 (1990); and Tim Weaver et al.,
“Comorbidity of Substance Misuse and Mental Illness in the Community Mental Health and Substance Misuse
Services,” British Journal of Psychiatry 183, no. 4 (2003).
7. Steel et al., “Association of Torture.”
8. Pacella, Hruska, and Delahanty, “Physical Health Consequences,” 42.
9. Melissa Farley et al., “Trauma History and Relapse Probability among Patients Seeking Substance Abuse
Treatment,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 27, no. 2 (2004): 162; Nancy Wu et al., “Childhood Trauma and
Health Outcomes in Adults with Comorbid Substance Abuse and Mental Health Disorders,” Addictive Behaviors
35, no. 1 (2010): 70; and Merith Cosden et al., “Trauma Symptoms for Men and Women in Substance Abuse
Treatment: A Latent Transition Analysis,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 50 (2015): 18.
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30 to 50 percent of individuals with a mental illness will be diagnosed with a
substance-abuse disorder at some point.10
Experiencing trauma (particularly during childhood) decreases an individual’s
impulse control, and more frequent and severe trauma intensifies the effect.11
Unsurprisingly, both PTSD and depression correlate with impulse-control
disorders.12 Additionally, diminished impulse control links to a “broad spectrum
of personal and social problems,” including violence and crime.13 In the
United States, an example of diminished impulse control can include a
road-rage incident, during which a driver displays uncontrolled anger in response
to another motorist’s actions.
In a high-trauma state like Afghanistan, examples are more plentiful.
I witnessed other violent outbursts during my deployment to a small Afghan
province. A mayor smacked a police officer in the face before the start of a shūrā.
The act apparently resulted from stress experienced during preparation for the
arrival of distinguished visitors. On another occasion, two field-grade officers
assaulted each other at the police headquarters over a petty squabble. On
another occasion, a firefight erupted at an illegal checkpoint. A district chief ’s
bodyguards, who had established the checkpoint, opened fire on plainclothes
police officers who were illegally providing security for a businessman’s convoy
and refused to pay the illegal toll.
Step Two: More Violence and a Lowered Threshold for Lethal Force
A consensus exists in psychiatric literature that severe mental illness increases
the risk of violence.14 On average, people with severe mental illness, especially
when combined with substance-abuse problems, act more violently, as do people
10. Regier et al., “Comorbidity of Mental Disorders,” 2,514, 2,517; and Robert Drake et al., “A Review of
Treatments for People with Severe Mental Illnesses and Co-Occurring Substance Use Disorders,” Psychiatric
Rehabilitations Journal 27, no. 4 (2004): 360–61.
11. John A. Fairbank, Frank W. Putnam, and William W. Harris, “The Prevalence and Impact of Child
Traumatic Stress,” in Handbook of PTSD: Science and Practice (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 240;
Emil Coccaro, “Intermittent Explosive Disorder as a Disorder of Impulsive Aggression for DSM-5,”
American Journal of Psychiatry 169, no. 6 (2012): 584; and Bessel A. van der Kolk, “The Trauma Spectrum:
The Interaction of Biological and Social Events in the Genesis of the Trauma Response,” Journal of Traumatic
Stress 1, no. 3 (1988).
12. Michel Lejoyeux et al., “Impulse Control Disorders and Depression,” Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 190, no. 5 (2002): 310, 314; Moshe Kotler et al., “Anger, Impulsivity, Social Support, and Suicide Risk
in Patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 189, no. 3 (2001); and
Byron Good and Devon Hinton, “Introduction: Culture, Trauma, and PTSD,” in Culture and PTSD: Trauma in
Global and Historical Perspective, ed. Devon Hinton and Byron Good (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2016).
13. Dianne Tice, Ellen Bratslavsky, and Roy F. Baumeister, “Emotional Distress Regulation Takes Precedence
over Impulse Control,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, no. 1 (2001): 53; and Menahem Krakowski,
“Violence and Serotonin: Influence of Impulse Control, Affect Regulation, and Social Functioning,” Journal of
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15, no. 3 (2003): 294–95, 300.
14. Richard Van Dorn, Jan Volavka, and Norman Johnson, “Mental Disorder and Violence: Is There a
Relationship beyond Substance Use?,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 47, no. 3 (2011): 487.
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with diminished impulse control. The research, however, contains variation.
For example, researchers debate the confounding factors that cause the
increased risk of violence among people with mental illness. For instance,
recent scholarship has focused on the potential effects of substance abuse, prior
violence, and familial factors.15
As the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders observes,
people with PTSD may engage in aggressive physical behavior with “little
or no provocation.”16 Richard Van Dorn and colleagues observe the strongest
associations with violence come from individuals with both severe mental illness
and substance-use disorders.17 The manual also notes individuals who suffer
from impulse control and similar disorders often exhibit behaviors that “violate
the rights of others . . . and/or bring the individual into significant conflict with
societal norms or authority figures.”18
Most studies treat the threshold when citizens will use lethal force to achieve
their goals as a constant. This treatment is puzzling because norms vary in related
areas (such as the prevalence of gun violence, murder rates, and the number of
active-shooter events)—even across similar countries. For example, the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime’s Intentional Homicide database indicates the United States
has a homicide rate four to eight times greater than Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom.19
In her work examining societal violence after civil conflict has ended, Chrissie
Steenkamp refers to a “culture of violence” in which the norms and values that
sustain the use of violence become established in a society. She attributes the
culture of violence, in part, to the effects of trauma, when previous norms and
values are replaced with ones perpetuating the use of violence in daily life.20
Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt advance a similar argument about child soldiers.
They find the effects of trauma plus the influence of learning by observation and
imitation during the war normalized the use of violence as a problem-solving
technique in the child soldiers’ postwar lives.21 Similarly, Elisabeth Schauer and
Thomas Elbert observed after war ends, child soldiers continue to use physical
15. Matthew Roché et al., “Prevalence and Risk of Violent Ideation and Behavior in Serious Mental Illnesses:
An Analysis of 63,572 Patient Records,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 36, no. 5-6 (2021); and Hanna Pickarda
and Seena Fazelb, “Substance Abuse as a Risk Factor for Violence in Mental Illness: Some Implications for
Forensic Psychiatric Practice and Clinical Ethics,” Current Opinion in Psychiatry 26, no. 4 (2013): 350.
16. American Psychiatric Association, Manual of Mental Disorders, 272–73, 275.
17. Van Dorn, Volavka, and Johnson, “Mental Disorder and Violence,” 487, 491.
18. American Psychiatric Association, Manual of Mental Disorders, 461.
19. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People),” World Bank Open Data
(website), n.d., http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5.
20. Chrissie Steenkamp, “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after
Peace Accords,” Round Table 94, no. 379 (2005): 254–55, 264.
21. Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt, “Child Soldiers as Time Bombs? Adolescents’ Participation in Rebel
Groups and the Recurrence of Armed Conflict,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 414.
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violence frequently to resolve conflicts, even after the child soldiers return to their
prewar environments.22
Step Three: Rebels Kill Government Officials and Security Forces
More violent societies are likely to produce rebels willing to employ lethal
force against their governments than less violent societies are. Steenkamp’s
“culture of violence” argument suggests societies can develop norms that allow
and promote the use of violence to achieve goals or resolve problems. In such
cultures, citizens who have joined or are affiliated with a rebel group will be
more willing to use violence against their governments because violence has
already become socially acceptable.23
When cultural norms against violence erode and citizens increasingly use
violence to achieve goals or resolve conflicts, rebels are more likely to employ
lethal force in pursuit of their group’s objectives. Depression and PTSD correlate
with impulse-control disorders and substance abuse. Additionally, a relationship
exists between severe childhood trauma, brain development, and impulse control.24
All these elements increase the likelihood citizens who join a rebel group will
be more willing to use lethal force against their governments.
Step Four: More Civil War
Finally, a conflict can only qualify as a civil war if rebels and government
security forces do enough killing. For instance, the frequently used definitions
from the Correlates of War project and Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
Peace Research Institute Oslo require both sides to inflict a minimum number
of deaths on each other. In the Correlates of War project definition, at least 1,000
battle-related combatant deaths must occur in a 12-month period, with the
weaker side inflicting at least 5 percent of the fatalities, for the conflict to qualify

22. Elisabeth Schauer and Thomas Elbert, “The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering,” in Trauma
Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, ed. Erin Martz (New York: Springer, 2010), 335.
23. Steenkamp, “Legacy of War,” 254.
24. Lejoyeux et al., “Impulse Control Disorders,” 310, 314; Kotler et al., “Anger,” 162–67; Good and Hinton,
“Introduction”; and Fairbank, Putnam, and Harris, “Child Traumatic Stress,” 240.
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as a civil war.25 By definition, civil war cannot occur unless rebels kill 50 members
of the government or security forces.
Mechanism 2: Trauma, Opportunity, and Civil War
Trauma may also serve as a remote cause for civil war by making war more
feasible. In this instance, instead of directly causing civil war, trauma amplifies
the direct cause—feasibility—such that an increase in trauma rates makes civil
war more achievable. This explanation argues civil war becomes more likely as
opportunity increases.26 For example, when the effectiveness of a government’s
security force decreases, the opportunity for civil war increases. Similarly, as
recruiting rebels becomes easier, the opportunity for civil war increases. In this
context, higher rates of trauma help explain how rebel recruitment can become
easier and why security force effectiveness might decrease, even if factors such as
the number of troops and defense spending remain the same.
In countries with high rates of trauma, governments recruit bureaucrats and
members of the security force from the pool of increasingly traumatized citizens.
Increased exposure to traumatic stressors results in more substance abuse, a
greater prevalence of mental illness, and negative changes to the brain.27 These
factors would make the government’s security force less capable and therefore
less effective. Although no studies of trauma’s effects on the effectiveness of
Afghan security forces, for instance, are available, RAND Corporation research
on US servicemembers provides context and a potential proxy for trauma’s impact
on effectiveness. For example, RAND found one-third of US servicemembers
diagnosed with PTSD were discharged for medical reasons between 2012 and
2015. More than a fifth of these servicemembers received an 80 percent or higher
disability rating, and all received at least a 50 percent disability rating.28
Mental illness can also play a role in recruiting rebels since it correlates strongly
with unemployment. An estimated 60 to 90 percent of people with mental illness
will be unemployed at some point.29 Unemployment results in loss of income,
which makes it easier to recruit rebels using financial incentives. In low-income
25. Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0: Definitions and Variables” (working
paper, Correlates of War project, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2000), https://correlatesofwar.org/data
-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook.
26. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance.”
27. Deborah Weber and Cecil Reynolds, “Clinical Perspectives on Neurobiological Effects of Psychological
Trauma,” Neuropsychology Review 14, no. 2 (2004); and Anke Karl et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Structural Brain
Abnormalities in PTSD,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 30, no. 7 (2006).
28. Heather Krull et al., Post-9/11 Trends in Medical Separation and Separation for Service Members with
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021).
29. Deborah Schofield et al., “The Personal and National Costs of Mental Health Conditions: Impacts on
Income, Taxes, Government Support Payments Due to Lost Labour Force Participation,” BMC Psychiatry 11,
no. 1 (2011): 72; and Ruth Crowther et al., “Helping People with Severe Mental Illness to Obtain Work:
Systematic Review,” BMJ 322, no. 7,280 (2001).
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states, where the majority of civil wars occur, the effects of job loss are more
pronounced because a larger portion of the population lives paycheck to paycheck,
and unemployment benefits are not available.
In sum, trauma may serve as a remote cause for the feasibility (or opportunity)
argument for civil war, since more trauma may decrease security force effectiveness
and ease conditions for the recruitment of rebels. This in turn makes civil war
more likely.
Mechanism 3: Trauma, Motivation, and Civil War
Trauma may also serve as a remote cause for civil war by increasing grievances
among the population, which increases their motivation to rebel. This theory
suggests people rebel against their governments when sufficiently motivated
by grievances, greed, or a combination of both.30 Trauma provides a rationale
for the variation of grievances among countries when the traditional grievance
measures of government type, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and religious
differences remain the same. Scholars have argued civil wars should be more
likely in autocratic states because the citizens do not have a way to participate
in their governance. Conversely, democracies should be less likely to experience
civil wars because the citizens have ways (such as voting and petitioning elected
representatives) to participate in democratic processes.
People in high-trauma states should be more aggrieved and, therefore, more
motivated to rebel than their low-trauma counterparts. By definition, victims
of man-made trauma have legitimate grievances that often persist long after
traumatic events have ended. Casualties of torture, war, and rape can point to
a specific person or group as the source of their pain. In these cases, grievances
increase in a general sense, and these human-caused stressors contribute to an
“us versus them” mindset. In response, trauma victims and their loved ones are
likely to become more motivated to rebel, and they have a ready-made “them”
against whom to execute their violence.
Large-scale trauma and hatred go hand in hand. After experiencing a traumatic
stressor, people frequently manifest intense anger.31 In research conducted in
Afghanistan, Barbara Cardozo and her colleagues noted high levels of hatred
across survey respondents—84 percent reported feeling “a lot” of or “extreme”
hatred, and 62 percent reported they had endured four or more traumatic events

30. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance.”
31. Linda Young and Elizabeth Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance,” in Understanding Trauma: A Psychoanalytical
Approach, ed. Caroline Garland (London: Duckworth, 1998), 81.
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within the past 10 years, which is approximately nine times the trauma rate found
in other countries.32
Many trauma victims look for an opportunity to redress their grievances.33
Linda Young and Elizabeth Gibb present a continuum along which grievances can
be assuaged. On one end of the spectrum, an apology suffices. At the other end,
justice requires violent revenge.34 A study of rape and nonsexual assault victims
revealed a “relatively high” preference for revenge. For some of these victims, even
“an eye for an eye” was insufficient; these victims desired acts of “extreme and
unending” violence against those who harmed them.35
Summary
Trauma helps improve our understanding of civil war in three ways. First, it
provides an explanation for why and how violence becomes normalized within a
society as a legitimate way to achieve goals and resolve problems. Second, trauma
may serve as a remote cause for the opportunity theory of civil war by decreasing
the effectiveness of the government’s security forces and making the recruitment
of rebels easier. Finally, trauma may serve as a remote cause of the motivation
theory for civil war by increasing the sense of grievance and the desire for revenge
among the population.

Testing the Trauma Theory of Civil War
This section reports the results of a large-n statistical analysis that included the
creation of a trauma index and trauma variables for testing and the results from
three statistical tests. For more information on the data and statistical analysis,
please contact the author at egoepner@masonlive.gmu.edu.
Trauma Index
The trauma index includes all countries in the international system in any
given year and the countries’ scores in four areas. The first three areas include the
most pernicious forms of traumatic stressors: torture, rape, and war. The fourth
32. Barbara Cardozo, “Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Disability in Postwar Afghanistan,” Journal
of the American Medical Association 292, no. 5 (2004): 575, 583; and Kate Scott et al., “Associations between
Lifetime Traumatic Events and Subsequent Chronic Physical Conditions: A Cross-National, Cross-Sectional
Study,” PLOS ONE 8, no. 11 (2013).
33. Young and Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance”; Uli Orth, “Punishment Goals of Crime Victims,” Law and
Human Behavior 27, no. 2 (2003); Garth Davies, Edith Wu, and Richard Frank, “A Witch’s Brew of Grievances:
The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent Extremism,” Taylor and Francis Online,
May 10, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1923188?scroll=top&needAcces
s=true; and David Mendeloff, “Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of
Post-Conflict Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009).
34. Young and Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance.”
35. Orth, “Punishment Goals,” 179, 183.
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captures more general forms of trauma, such as natural disasters. The trauma
index provides a country-by-country snapshot from 1990 to 2014. Each country
receives an annual score from zero to 100, with each of the four areas representing
25 percent of the score. (Earl Babbie and others recommend equal weighting
unless compelling circumstances suggest doing otherwise. No methodological or
theoretical concerns existed with the trauma variables, so I used equal weighting.)36
Higher scores indicate higher rates of trauma.
The four areas of the index comprise nine variables, eight of which come from
established data sets.

•

The author created the ninth variable, which measures the prevalence
of rape, using data from the Department of State and Amnesty
International. The methodology and scoring criteria for the rape
variable followed Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås’s work on
rape and sexual violence during war.37

•

The torture component comprises an average of the Political Terror
Scale and Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset torture
measures.38 These data measure the amount of torture and political
violence occurring within each country.

•

The measure for war trauma comprises three variables: years of peace,
battle deaths per capita, and area of the country affected by fighting.
The data came from the Correlates of War project, the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, and the
Center for Systemic Peace.

•

The general trauma category consists of disasters, mortality rates
for persons under the age of 40, and internally displaced persons
or refugees. These data came from the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters, the UN Population Division, the Center
for Systemic Peace, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

36. Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 14th ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2015), 164; Frederik
Booysen, “An Overview and Evaluation of Composite Indices of Development,” Social Indicators Research 59,
no. 2 (August 2002): 127–28; and Michela Nardo et al., Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators:
Methodology and User Guide (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008), 31.
37. Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),”
American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013); and Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual
Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989–2009,” Journal of Peace Research 51,
no. 3 (2014).
38. “Data,” Political Terror Scale (website), n.d., https://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/; and “The CIRI
Human Rights Dataset, Version 2014.04.14,” Harvard Dataverse (website), n.d., https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN
/UKCPXT.
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Table 1 shows the 10 countries with the highest and lowest trauma averages for
the 25-year period.
Table 1. Countries with highest and lowest trauma averages for 25-year period

Highest Trauma

Lowest Trauma

Country

Score

Country

Score

Sudan

76

Luxembourg

0

Afghanistan

75

Finland

2

Somalia

74

Iceland

2

Democratic Republic of the Congo

69

Norway

3

India

68

Brunei

4

Colombia

67

Malta

4

Iraq

64

Denmark

5

Myanmar

63

Netherlands

5

Uganda

63

Grenada

6

Sri Lanka

62

Samoa

6

As Table 2 shows, countries that descended into civil war had experienced
substantially higher trauma levels before the wars began. For instance, trauma
scores more than doubled from an average of 27 for all countries not at war to 57
for those that would experience civil war within three years’ time.
Table 2. Trauma index means

Trauma Scores
No Civil War

Three Years Prior

Two Years Prior

27.34

57.00

54.22

One Year Prior Civil War Ongoing
57.49

68.90

Tests and Results
As trauma increased, so did the likelihood of civil war. Trauma consistently
showed a positive and statistically significant relationship with the prevalence of
civil war across all three statistical tests.
This study analyzed every country in the international system with a
population of at least 100,000 for the 25-year period (1990–2014). Previous
studies have found only three variables consistently significant: population size,
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income per capita, and economic growth rates. More specifically, more populous
countries have more civil war, as do poorer countries and countries with shrinking
economies. As such, all tests controlled for these variables.
Because everyone accepts civil war results in more trauma, steps should
be taken to ensure the tests measure trauma’s effect on civil war rather than
inadvertently capturing civil war’s effect on trauma. Without taking appropriate
steps to deconflict the confounding effect of war-related trauma, the argument
can become circular. Trauma may increase the prevalence of civil war, but civil war
also increases the prevalence of trauma. In circumstances like these, quantitative
researchers recommend the use of instrumental variable estimation to address the
possibility trauma and civil war simultaneously cause each other. (Instrumental
variable estimation produces a consistent estimator when, for instance, concerns
x causes y and y causes x exist simultaneously).39 In the civil-war literature,
however, researchers rarely use instrumental variables. Instead, researchers use
logistic regression and lag the independent variables. As a result, their statistical
models would compare, for example, income levels in 1999 with civil wars in 2000.
By lagging variables like income levels, researchers hope to eliminate the second
half of the circular argument, which says civil war lowers income levels. This study
used both instrumental variables and logistic regression with lagged variables.
The statistical analyses used three variations of the dependent variable for
civil war: the Armed Conflict Dataset with a minimum of 1,000 battle-related
deaths, the Armed Conflict Dataset with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths,
and the Correlates of War data set with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths. Data
for the control variables—population size, income, and economic growth rates—
came from the World Bank.40
Finally, to parse whether the trauma index may be a proxy for previous war, the
study ran models to determine whether trauma remained a significant factor after
controlling for previous war (trauma remained significant).
First Test: Logistic Regression with Random Effects
In the first test, trauma had a significant effect on the prevalence of civil war.
The model indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index score, the
likelihood of future civil war increased by 9 percent. In addition, population was
significant; as population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Economic

39. Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics, 6th ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 139–41.
40. “Population, Total,” World Bank Open Data (website), n.d., https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP
.TOTL; and “GDP per Capita (Current US$),” World Bank Open Data (website), n.d., https://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD (page discontinued).
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growth was also significant; as the economy shrank, the risk of civil war increased.
Income, however, was not a significant factor.
Second Test: Logistic Regression with Fixed Effects
In the second test, trauma again had a significant effect on the prevalence of
civil war. The model indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index
score, the likelihood of future civil war increased by 7 percent. Population was
again significant. As population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Income
was also significant. As personal income shrank, the risk of civil war increased.
Nevertheless, economic growth was not a significant factor.
Third Test: Two-Stage Least Squares
In the third test, trauma had a significant effect on the prevalence of civil
war. The models indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index score,
the likelihood of future civil war increased by 7 percent. Population was again
significant. As population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Economic
variables returned inconsistent results. Economic growth was significant in one of
the two model specifications, and income was not significant in either.
Marginal Effects of Trauma on the Probability of Civil War
When trauma and the three control variables were held at their averages,
civil war had a near-zero, 0.30 percent probability of occurring in any given
country in any given year. A 10-point increase in trauma from its median value
of 26 (to 36) only increased the probability of civil war to 0.95 percent in any
given country in any given year. Once a country reached a trauma score of 57,
however, the likelihood of civil war rose to one in 10. If a trauma score rose to 65,
the country had a 20 percent chance of experiencing civil war the following year.
Summary
Trauma appears to have a significant and positive relationship with the
prevalence of civil war. The use of instrumental variables to test the trauma
theory suggests the relationship may be causal—higher trauma levels among
a population cause more civil war, regardless of whether the countries experienced
war previously. The relationship appears to be robust because it remained strong
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across all four areas of the trauma index, multiple statistical tests, and alternate
specifications of the dependent variable.

Recommendations
Do Not Intervene Militarily in the Civil Wars of Trauma States
Countries with high rates of trauma will experience more future civil war. This
correlation appears to be driven partly by the normalization of violence that follows
severe and repetitive trauma exposure, which presents intervening actors like the
US military with a dilemma. Intervention in a trauma state such as Afghanistan
has a low chance of achieving an enduring peace, leaving the intervening party
stuck in an enduring conflict. Each new surge of military forces and financial
aid may become tomorrow’s sunk costs, and no president wants to admit failure
occurred on his or her watch. Moreover, military intervention may inadvertently
make the situation worse. For example, Afghanistan’s trauma score rose during the
five-year period after US forces arrived when compared to the country’s trauma
score from the five-year period prior to intervention, and the level of trauma
remained elevated as of 2014 (the last year of the trauma index). An increase in
the number of combatants increases trauma rates for the population, intensifying
trauma’s negative effects and further normalizing the use of violence. The likelihood
of continued civil war increases in response to military intervention.
Plan for the Negative Effects of Trauma before Intervening
Currently, US policymakers, intelligence professionals, and military planners
do not consider a nation’s trauma before intervening in the nation’s civil war.
Ignoring this important factor suggests US policies have been suboptimal.
Since the beginning of the “global war on terrorism,” the US military has
adapted significantly in multiple areas. Intelligence estimates that once focused on
the physical terrain now analyze the “human terrain”—the psychological, cultural,
and behavioral attributes of the populations American forces seek to protect.41
Military members have learned the languages, customs, and histories of the

41. Nomination of General David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General, and to Be Commander,
International Security Assistance Force, and Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan, Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of David H. Petraeus, commander, United States Central
Command); and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf.
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countries in which the members fight. But the degree to which Afghans and Iraqis
have already been traumatized has gone unexamined.
As the Department of Defense now recognizes the significant effects PTSD
and other mental health problems can have on American troops, military planners
and policymakers should account for a foreign nation’s mental health status before
intervening in an ongoing civil war. Had planners and policymakers analyzed
the Afghan population before embarking on a decade-and-a-half of nation
building, the analysis would have cast significant doubt on the prospects for
peace. If planners and policymakers continue to ignore the impact of trauma on
a population’s mental health status, they will fail to account for important factors
that affect the war outcome they seek to control.
Treat Trauma as a National Security Concern
Although it has traditionally been viewed as a humanitarian crisis,
the traumatization of a population is also a legitimate security concern.
Naturally, human suffering should elicit empathy among concerned citizens
and a humanitarian response from the agencies available to provide help.
Additionally, trauma should cause international organizations and sovereign
states to estimate the future security impacts of war. If more trauma in a
population’s past results in more future civil war, then security-focused entities
like the Department of Defense and the CIA should be using the data to
predict and plan accordingly.
Deploy Evidence-Based Mental Health Capabilities to Trauma States
Optimally, support would be deployed before a trauma state descended
into civil war. Failing that, the military or a government partner should apply
mental health capabilities to mitigate trauma’s negative effects, especially as
related to host-nation government officials and security force members who will
be essential in achieving an enduring peace.
To the ears of warfighters, including such soft capabilities may sound
incompatible with the nature of war. But these capabilities align with US Joint
doctrine, which states countering an insurgency requires “the blend of comprehensive
. . . efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its
root causes.”42 In simpler language, such effort means killing and capturing rebels
while also supporting the population through “political, psychological, and economic
methods.” Although current counterinsurgency doctrine does not mention the
mental health of the host nation, trauma and its negative effects fit nicely with
42.

JCS, Counterinsurgency, xiii.
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the military’s emphasis on addressing “root causes” and supporting the population
through psychological methods.43
Use the Trauma Index in Predictive Models to Anticipate Civil-War Locations
Organizations like the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department
of State have used predictive modeling to anticipate state failure and national
crises.44 The addition of the trauma index and its variables should improve
such models’ predictive power. Initial comparisons with models that include
widely used variables (income, economic growth, and population size) indicate
the addition of the trauma index improves the models. This is suggested by
the results of different measures often used in model selection, such as Akaike
information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, and receiver-operating
characteristic analysis.45

Conclusion
The data suggest a statistically significant relationship exists between the level
of trauma previously experienced by a national population and the prevalence of
civil war in the country’s future (which holds regardless of past war). The theory
underlying this observation proposes a causal linkage between trauma and civil
war. As citizens are exposed to more frequent and severe traumatic stressors,
they succumb to higher rates of mental illness, substance abuse, and diminished
impulse control. On average, traumatized individuals use violence more frequently
in their daily lives, and violence becomes increasingly normalized as a way to
resolve problems and achieve goals. As a result, the threshold at which potential
rebels use deadly force against their government decreases and the likelihood of
civil war rises.
Trauma may also increase the prevalence of civil war indirectly by amplifying
factors associated with the opportunity and motivation theories. First,
governments and security forces should become less effective as they recruit from
increasingly traumatized populations. Second, rebel recruitment should be easier
because more trauma results in more unemployment, which lowers opportunity
costs. Third, traumatized individuals have genuine grievances that can motivate

43. JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-4, IV-2.
44. Daniel Etsy et al., “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings,” Environmental Change & Security
Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 49–72; and Sean O’Brien, “Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support:
Contemporary Approaches and Thoughts on Future Research,” International Studies Review 12, no. 1 (2010).
45. Kennedy, Guide to Econometrics, 95; and Kelly H. Zou, James O’Malley, and Laura Mauri,
“Receiver-Operating Characteristic Analysis for Evaluating Diagnostic Tests and Predictive Models,”
Circulation 115, no. 5 (February 6, 2007): 654–57.
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them to use violence, and they often have a specific person or group they hold
responsible for their pain.
The relationship between trauma and civil war has profound implications
for policymakers, planners, and warfighters. Once started, the vicious cycle
of trauma and violence is hard to stop. This feedback mechanism decreases the
likelihood intervening actors like the United States will be able to end a civil war.

Erik W. Goepner
Dr. Erik W. Goepner has a PhD in public policy from George Mason University.
A retired US Air Force colonel, he currently works as a civil servant in the
federal government.

War and Its Effects

Goepner

Select Bibliography
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association
Publishing, 2013.
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. “Beyond Greed and Grievance”
Feasibility and Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. “How Much War Will We See?
Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3
(2002), 307–34.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24. Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
Karl, Anke, et al. “A Meta-Analysis of Structural Brain Abnormalities in PTSD.”
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 30, no. 7 (2006): 1004–31.
Steel, Zachary, et al. “Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic
Events with Mental Health Outcomes among Populations Exposed to Mass
Conf lict and Displacement.” Journal of the American Medical Association 302
no. 5 (20 09): 537– 49, https://jamanet work.com /journals/jama /article
-abstract/184348.
Van Dorn, Richard, Jan Volavka, and Norman Johnson. “Mental Disorder and
Violence: Is There a Relationship beyond Substance Use?” Social Psychiatry and
Psychiatric Epidemiology 47, no. 3 (2011): 487–503.

77

